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Social benefit bonds: Financial
markets inside the state
Angela Mitropoulos and Dick Bryan
Social benefit bonds (SBBs), also referred to as social impact bonds
(SIBs), are a very recent innovation in the fields of social policy and
finance.1 They are profoundly challenging the conventional division be-
tween states and markets, and public and private sectors, since they
involve the private funding of programs that are embedded within the
provision of state services. So, unlike privatisation and subcontract-
ing, where the state cedes high levels of control to non-state providers,
SBBs bring financial calculation and the pursuit of financial yield inside
the state. To date, they have applied exclusively to welfare programs
(specifically recidivism in the prison sector and juvenile offence in the
context of foster care). For politicians preoccupied with fiscal austerity,
SBBs are depicted as an instrument that creatively breaks the impasse
of restricted public policy funding and passes the risk of policy initia-
tives outside the state. For welfare service providers strapped for cash,
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1 The first such bond was issued in September 2011, in relation to Peterborough
Prison in the United Kingdom (Social Finance 2011).
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SBBs anticipate a significant expansion of resources, albeit with added
dimensions of performance accountability and metrics. For private fi-
nancial investors, these bonds are presented as alternative investment
devices that promise yield and the ability to diversify risk in their port-
folios.
While many currently operate as only pilot schemes, SBBs repre-
sent a significant transformation in the conception, funding and oper-
ation of an increasing number of social policy domains. They warrant
close consideration, both in terms of their merits as a form of funding
of state initiatives and their applications beyond their present focus. In
this chapter, we will develop:
1. A brief account of the background of the policy environment in
which SBBs have emerged.
2. An overview of the recent development of SBBs in Australia.
3. An analysis of the SBBs as financial instruments: What is the bond
in social benefit bonds?
4. An analysis of SBBs as social policy instruments: What is the social
in social benefits bonds?
5. A conclusion about the wider social and policy significance of the
arrival of SBBs.
The policy context of the emergence of SBBs
While SBBs express a financial logic – which we will explain shortly – it
would be misleading to present them merely as a new financial inven-
tion without social and historical context. Building on the concepts of
social entrepreneurship, social investment and social enterprise, SBBs
articulate an agenda of blending philanthropy and profitable invest-
ment. Social Finance UK has been at the forefront of initiating this on a
global scale. Their depiction of their role is revealing:
Many charities and social enterprises face serious financial chal-
lenges that stop them from carrying out their work effectively. We
believe that, if social problems are to be tackled successfully, or-
ganisations seeking to solve them need sustainable revenues and
investment to innovate and grow …
Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social Policy
154
Social Finance brings together individuals with substantial ex-
pertise in finance, strategy consultancy and the social sector to drive
innovative, sustainable and scalable investment propositions. We
combine a deep understanding of social issues with expertise in fi-
nancial modelling, business case development and investment struc-
turing (see Social Finance 2011).
The implementation of such an initiative would not have been possible
had there not been a culture advocating empowering ‘communities’
rather than ‘bureaucrats’, and ‘investment’ rather than ‘public expendi-
ture’. At their base, SBBs involve a particularly novel approach to, and
understanding of, state capacities.
SBBs came into existence in the United Kingdom in 2011 and soon
after they were being developed in Massachusetts and in New York,
but the United Kingdom most clearly reveals their social foundations.
SBBs were given focus by the Blair Labour government (1997–2007)
through the Social Investment Taskforce, established by Gordon Brown
as Chancellor in 2000. By 2010 the taskforce was clearly an advocate
for the introduction of SBBs (Social Investment Taskforce 2010), but
their realisation awaited the broader social politics of the subsequent
Conservative–Liberal government (2010–). SBBs became a significant
component of that government’s ‘Big Society’ program. According to
the Prime Minister David Cameron, the stated aim of Big Society is to
take power away from politicians and empower local people and com-
munities. This vision of social policy promises to replace the massive
receipt of state help with a new culture of voluntarism, philanthropy
and social action (Cameron 2010). In this context, Big Society Finance
is central, offering to ‘tap into the huge pool of capital for social pur-
poses, and thereby transforming the prospects of the socially disad-
vantaged’ (Cohen 2012). Situated within this vision, SBBs make use of
financial techniques to break down social policy into components that
can be invested in and traded and, more specifically, they depict the
act of financing as an instance of community involvement. The same
process can be described as an agenda of reducing dependence on the
state in the name of individual responsibility, or more specifically as the
transfer of certain kinds of risks from the state to investors, individuals
and households.
4 Social benefit bonds
155
In Australia, this same focus on social transformation is critical.
While it has not been characterised as part of a Big Society agenda, it
has nevertheless evolved in connection to it. The federal government
explains SBBs in its social investment and philanthropy hub2 in this
way:
The financial viability of the [charitable] sector depends on the ability
of organisations to generate new sources of income. For example,
many charitable organisations are now providers of community ser-
vices funded by state and federal government. These services include
child care, aged care and community transport services for people
with special needs, just to name a few.
Social investment (also called impacting investing) seeks to ad-
dress the limitations on the funding of social organisations by im-
proving the flow of capital. Social investment involves actively sourc-
ing and placing capital in investment products that generate social,
environment or cultural good while delivering some financial return
to the investor. This capital may be in a range of forms including
quasi-equity, debt, working capital, lines of credit, and loan guaran-
tees (Australian Government n.d.a).
This is the context in which the federal government is evaluating SBBs,
although it notes that they are largely state and territory initiatives, and
there is the caveat that ‘there is limited research on the long-term effec-
tiveness of [SBB]s’ and they involve ‘long trailing costs for government’
(Australian Government n.d.b).
2 This hub remains ongoing despite the change in government. Indeed, it is
reasonable to anticipate that it will develop increasing prevalence if the
Liberal–National Party government follows even broadly the direction of the UK
Conservative Party. The Federal government website states: ‘The purpose of the
social investment and philanthropy hub is to create a forum to share information
and promote initiatives that can facilitate greater private capital flows into areas
that had previously been the domain of government’ (Australian Government,
n.d.a).
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The emergence of SBBs in Australia
Presently in Australia, SBBs exist only as pilot programs. In September
2011, NSW Treasurer Mike Baird announced that the Liberal govern-
ment would establish a trial of the bonds. The government identified
the reduction of prisoner re-incarceration rates and a decrease in
government-subsidised foster care as the two areas in which it will con-
duct pilot schemes of the bond. In March 2013, contracts were signed
for Australia’s first SBB. The 2013–14 NSW budget announced:
$7 million in private capital has been raised by the Newpin Social
Benefit Bond to expand UnitingCare Burnside’s Newpin [New Parent
and Infant Network] program, which supports children in foster care
to be safely restored to their families and prevents children at risk
from entering care in the first place.
$1 million will be provided in 2013–14 for the implementation
of the Newpin Social Benefit Bond ($8.5 million over four years)
(NSW Government 2013).
As summarised by the NSW Department of Family and Community
Services (2013):
The $7 million bond will initially fund four centres and pay for the
expansion of UnitingCare Burnside’s Newpin program which aims to
break the destructive cycle of family relationships that lead to abuse
and neglect.
By providing intensive support to improve parenting styles, be-
haviour and practices, the program helps parents to build positive
parent-child relationships. Newpin safely restores children in care to
their families and prevents entry into care.
When Newpin achieves agreed social outcomes, such as safely
restoring children in care to their families or preventing entry into
care, this generates significant social and economic benefits. These
benefits mean the government needs to spend less on acute services
and is able to spend taxpayers money helping families in other ways.
The savings delivered by successful outcomes are used to pay back
the investors’ upfront funding as well as provide a return to investors.
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The $7 million bond is issued through a special purpose trust managed
by Social Ventures Australia (SVA) with a maturity profile of seven
years and three months. According to Treasurer Baird (Baird & Goward
2013), ‘if the social program is effective and reaches pre-set targets, the
investor is repaid their principal plus an agreed return, which is based
on performance and capped at 15 percent [per annum].’ SVA expects
the bond to yield between 10 percent and 12 percent per annum: about
double the rate of return on corporate bonds (Rose 2013).
Interest payments on the bond are to be funded by periodic perfor-
mance payments to Burnside. Performance here is measured by com-
paring the percentage of Newpin participants deemed fit by the courts
to be reunited with their children against parents outside the program
whose children are in foster care. Of course, if the performance does
not measure up, there is no interest payment. For the overall bond, per-
formance is measured by whether the program achieves a 55 percent
restoration rate. It is not a difficult target to meet. It is certainly above
the 25 percent restoration rate among parents of fostered children with-
out access to the program, but in 2012 the Newpin program achieved a
74 percent restoration rate (Rose 2013).
This performance measure suggests that this trial SBB is a relatively
low risk investment, for the required success rate is already being sur-
passed. It is, no doubt, driven by the NSW government’s desire to
ensure the success of the bond for investors, as a foundation for further
bond issues in the state. Indeed, further bond issues have already been
announced. In May 2012, NSW Treasurer Baird (2012) announced the
selection of:
Social Finance and Mission Australia to jointly develop the pilot in
recidivism, which aims to assist 500 repeat offenders released from
Junee and Parklea prisons. The proposed bond is approximately $7
million over a term of five to six years.
As in Britain, where they are located within Big Society Finance, and
in the United States where the then New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg’s direct links to finance were critical,3 the development of
3 In August 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced his
Bloomberg Foundation, combined with Goldman Sachs, would offer an initial
Markets, Rights and Power in Australian Social Policy
158
SBBs in Australia has required political influence to promote an alter-
native vision of the public sector and to construct avenues for private
finance to enter the state. In Australia, Peter Shergold has been pivotal
to the unfolding of the bonds, situated at the intersection of finance and
public policy, and particularly welfare policy. He has previously held se-
nior public service positions, including Secretary of the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet in the Howard government and Head
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission. Shergold is
at present a director of AMP Limited, chairman of the NSW Public
Service Commission and head of the Centre for Social Impact’s joint
collaboration between four university business schools. He also has no-
table experience in welfare, having been central to the welfare reforms
precipitated by the Northern Territory Emergency Response (otherwise
referred to as the Intervention) introduced by the Howard government
(Shergold 2013). Drawing on each of these domains, he was commis-
sioned by the NSW government to oversee the development of SBBs in
NSW (Shergold 2012).
Critically, Shergold was active in the 2012 visit to Australia by
Phillip Blond, the leading intellectual in the UK Conservative gov-
ernment’s Big Society program. As James Whelan (2012) points out,
Blond ‘was introduced as a “friend of Australia” by the Prime Minister
(then Opposition leader) Tony Abbott to address a forum convened by
the Liberal Party’s thinktank, the Menzies Research Institute. During
his visit, Blond briefed senior Liberals and local government officials’
(2012, p. 6). Whelan goes on to note that ‘[e]lements of Cameron’s
agenda have been endorsed by the Centre for Civil Society, the Centre
for Social Impact, the Sydney Institute and by the Institute of Public Af-
US$10 million in SBBs to fund a pilot program to reduce the recidivism rate
among young offenders jailed at the Rikers Island correctional facility. Also critical
in the United States is the Harvard Social Impact Bond Technical Assistance Lab
(SIB Lab). Established by Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government
professor Jeffrey Liebman and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the lab
serves as a hands-on thinktank for helping governments foster innovation and
improve the results of their social-service spending. The Rockefeller grant
supports current students and recent graduates of the school’s Master in Public
Policy program who provide pro bono assistance in government offices on all
aspects of a SIB start-up phase (Pettus 2013).
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fairs whose director, John Roskam, urged Tony Abbott to adopt the “Big
Society” program’ (2012, p. 6).
What is the bond in social benefit bonds?
Bonds are familiar as ways of issuing debt for state and corporate trea-
suries. Corporations and states issue bonds (corporate and treasury
bonds) in which they receive money now and, in return, pay interest
at specified times and repay the principal at maturity. Conventionally,
the funds raised by a bond issue go into consolidated revenue, and from
there are used for funding all sorts of state expenditures.
Social benefit bonds are different from these conventional bonds.
Indeed, the use of the term ‘bond’ may be something of a misnomer, de-
signed to give an image of solidity when the process involved is closer to
a version of venture capital in the domain of social policy. Their bond-
like characteristic is simply that they operate for a fixed period in the
sense that there is a final payout: the dividends are not in perpetuity as
is the case, for example, with corporate shares.
Through SBBs, investors fund a program/intervention undertaken
within or under the auspices of the state and the rate of return on the
bond is contingent on the extent to which the program/intervention
achieves its stated aims. The premise here is that there are new projects
(though perhaps better understood as new initiatives within existing
projects) that are anticipated to have positive outcomes, but for which
state funding cannot be found. In this context, a state may leave the pro-
ject unfunded, and forgo the potential benefits, or it could invite private
funding.
The distinctive funding of social benefit bonds means that the pri-
vate investor takes on the risks of the proposed program/intervention,
although the investor does not actually undertake or manage the pro-
gram/intervention. The investor is purely taking a risk position, much
like a bet. If the program/intervention proves unsuccessful, the state
has made no expenditure, and the losses are borne by the private in-
vestor. If the intervention is deemed successful, the investor will make
a profit which must be paid for by the state. The source of the profit is
that the state will be willing to provide funding out of the future dollars
it will now not have to expend as a result of the successful intervention.
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So, for example, a social benefit bond issued in relation to recidivism
will, if the intervention is successful, be paid out of the funds that are
now saved by the state having fewer future prisoners to house.4 In this
formulation, the state in principle faces no down-side risk (hence they
have sometimes been called ‘pay for success bonds’).
In practice, regarding the specification of the exact terms of each
SBB issuance, the sharing of risks is a matter of negotiation, and returns
on the bond may well to some degree be underwritten by the state. For
instance, in the NSW Newpin Social Benefit Bond, if the initiative fails
in the first four years, investors will recover 75 percent of what they put
in. The recovery rate drops to 50 percent in the last three years (Rose
2013). Therefore the essential proposition is not that the state faces no
risk, but that the sharing of risk between the state and the investor is a
critical and conscious factor in the design of each bond issue.
So what is in SBBs for the investor? In the promotional material,
SBBs are sold in the name of financial institution noblesse oblige but
nevertheless with an anticipated positive rate of return. Indeed, it is no-
table that the terms ‘philanthropy’ and ‘investment returns’ are never
far apart. Beneath the social benefit vision there are precise financial
calculations and SBBs, like all conventional financial investments, are
subject to a careful risk/return calculation. We therefore need to under-
stand SBBs in the context of financial assets generally.
In the orbit of financial derivatives, the model of SBBs is a variety of
an options contract. As a derivative, SBBs involve the investor acquiring
an exposure to the performance of an investment, but involve no own-
ership of, or say in, the organisation that implements the investment.5
It is an option in the sense that the investor has purchased a contingent
4 In the case of the Peterborough Prison bond, the first SBB issued, the
recidivism rates are measured for the prisoners who have received the services (the
experimental group) and others with a similar profile who have not (the control
group). The government will only pay the investors if the drop is 10 percent or
more for the experimental group than for the control group (Hayat 2012).
5 See Bryan and Rafferty (2011) for an outline of the technical meaning and
social role of derivatives. Contracts that trade movements in a measure (be it a
measure expressed as a price or an index) are said to derive their value from the
value of the underlying asset. While that direction of causation is now contested
(in many cases derivative prices drive the price of the underlying asset), it gives
rise to the term derivative.
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claim: they will receive a payout should certain events occur (targets
are reached). If those targets are not reached, the bond is valueless on
expiry. The fact that particular SBBs may be underwritten by the state
then manifests as an undermining of the stated virtue of the SBB model.
In this sense, a SBB is no different in structure from an oil or
interest rate option. Alongside this, the appeal for investors is the ex-
pectation that SBBs diversify risk. The risk on an SBB is anticipated to
diverge from those on corporate equities and bonds and on commodity
prices and to respond to quite different determinants. It might be re-
called that at the time of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, investors
believed they had diversified portfolios. However, when the mortgage-
backed securities and, subsequently, credit default swap markets started
to crash, all sorts of asset markets followed them down as traders
headed to cash (or gold) for fear of default by their counterparties. Yet
SBBs hold no such (or little6) counterparty risks; their counterparty is
the state: SBBs are state-guaranteed, as are conventional government
bonds. Unlike standard government bonds, SBBs offer possibilities of
high rates of return for successful investment: in short, they are higher
risk (and hence involve a high expected return) but carry no default
risk. That is a valuable set of attributes in any hedge fund portfolio.7
The skill in specifying an SBB is, therefore, in conceiving of modes
of effective measurement of performance of an intervention, attaching
a precise risk measurement to the range of possible outcomes of the
intervention, and attaching a credible price to the combined measures
and risks. In the same terms, the potential for future diversification of
SBBs is premised on the capacity to define new ‘packages’ of measur-
able risks that attach to specific interventions and to measure outcomes
that might be attributed legally and exclusively to the intervention. This
6 State defaults in the European Union open up the possibility that contracts
with the state do carry some default risk.
7 Jonathon Greenblatt, Special Assistant to the US President and Director of the
Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation at the Domestic Policy Council
has argued that such low-risk instruments [as SBBs] could emerge as an essential
element in the balanced portfolios of sophisticated financial managers. Remarking
on the introduction of SBBs in Massachusetts, Greenblatt went on to announce
that it ‘is among the first shots of a modern revolution, a transformative process
that could alter the public conversation about how government interacts with the
private sector and public citizenry’ (Greenblatt 2011).
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requirement, we will see shortly, inherently limits the applicability of
SBBs to other domains of policy.
What is the social benefit in social benefit bonds?
There is a popular view, articulated in the federal government’s social
investment and philanthropy hub (cited earlier) that SBBs are a
‘win–win’ development. It is suggested that funds will flow to worthy
areas that would otherwise be underfunded and, moreover, that later-
ally conceived projects that might otherwise be dismissed because they
are risky will be precisely those that appeal to hedge fund investors. The
potential benefits seem clear. However, we should note that, as formal
financial contracts, SBBs embed a range of assumptions about how so-
cial policy is developing and should develop. We will note a number of
implicit assumptions in SBBs: assumptions that need to be accepted if
not explicitly embraced if SBBs are to become more widely used.
First, as the historical context of their emergence (discussed ear-
lier) implies, SBBs have been conceived in an era of fiscal austerity,
in which the state will leave worthy programs unfunded because, for
whatever reason, it is reluctant to fund social policy by taxes or to bor-
row via standard treasury bonds, even if programs are expected to be
long-run cost savers. Therefore the embrace of SBBs implies recogni-
tion that hitherto standard ways of funding social policy initiatives are
fundamentally contested.
Second, it follows that SBBs are challenging historical dichotomies
between state and market, and public and private. Unlike activities such
as subcontracting and public–private partnerships, SBBs involve recog-
nition that programs remain ‘inside’ the state in the sense that the
domains of prisoner education and foster care are state responsibilities
even if specific interventions funded by a SBB may be subcontracted.
Yet, although the identification of state rather than market oversight re-
mains critical, policy initiatives must be framed so as to comply with
the requirements of commercial financial calculation.
Third, and following on from the previous point: SBBs require the
calculation of quantifiable measures of performance, and dollar values
attached to those figures, so that the rate of return on an intervention
can be estimated in advance. Only on this basis can an investor make
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their risk-to-return calculations and choose whether to invest. Further,
as with all experiments, and in order to calculate the internal rate of
return for investors, SBBs presuppose the existence of controlled ex-
periments, with a control group which must be denied access to the
intervention, and not simply to determine whether an intervention
works (gives positive outcomes), but whether it works sufficiently to
generate a commercial rate of return on the investment.8 Precise mea-
surability of outcomes and differential access to controlled experiments
then become the drivers of policy.
Fourth, as financial contracts, SBBs are future-oriented; concerned
less with what is happening in the present than with probabilities about
what might happen tomorrow. The pertinent question that the bonds
pose is not the present but the future – not, that is to say, rates of impris-
onment but the probability that prisoners will re-offend; and not with
whether children should be removed from unsafe households but with
the future probability that they will need removal. Indeed, it is inherent
in the design of SBBs that they cannot engage the present but only the
future time of intergenerational risk. So while a particular SBB-funded
intervention X might be successful in the sense that it generates a pos-
itive rate of return for bond holders (and in the process peoples’ lives
have benefitted), SBBs cannot be used to fund the ongoing implementa-
tion of program X. Once the bond has been issued and the performance
is known, the risks and the returns are known: the future becomes the
present. Program X would no longer be funded by an SBB, for there are
no risks to trade. Whether program X continues to be funded in a ‘fu-
ture present’ must be determined by the willingness of governments to
fund via conventional means such as taxes and standard treasury bonds
or by contracting out the service.
Fifth, in the light of these ‘specifications’, we can appreciate why,
until now at least, SBBs have been focused in the domain of crime
and retraining (prisons and foster care and recidivism), and not the
pursuit of other social goals. For the investor, SBBs permit bets on prob-
abilities. Probabilities require norms, with risks (and hence returns)
conceived as distributions around norms. Hence probabilities of re-
turns to normalcy (‘rectification of bads’) become the natural domain
8 The Deed of Implementation Agreement for the Newpin Social Benefit Bond
describes the control group as providing the counterfactual rate of restoration.
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of SBBs rather than the pursuit of ‘goods’. If we think of the possibil-
ity of SBBs in relation to, say community art, one can imagine that
there would be social benefit from such an investment, but there will
be no objective metric to measure the benefit, and no quantifiable fu-
ture state savings from which the yield on the bond would be paid.
In schools, for example, one can imagine a SBB for remedial interven-
tions, in the names of future behaviour problem alleviation and future
unemployment. But a SBB to fund advanced student progression has
no potential, for there are no future government costs avoided by such
current expenditures. So while SBBs are expressions of financial imag-
ination, their innate agenda remains conservative, that is, they frame
social diversity as aberrations from statistical norms.
Sixth, these norms are themselves currently presented as the un-
folding agenda of social conservatism around gender, race and families
that was generated, not surprisingly, by the British Conservative Party
that played a critical role in bringing SBBs to life. In highlighting pris-
ons and foster care, SBBs underscore a longstanding preoccupation of
social policy with gender as it pertains to men and women perceived
in narrow and often normative terms, and the breakdown of traditional
familial roles and households. Particular understandings of the causes
of ‘family breakdown’9 and breakdowns in ‘law and order’ set the target
areas for SBBs, and the inability of agencies of the state to ameliorate
these breakdowns, in turn, then creates the space for investment in
the guise of a philanthropy providing social antidotes. In any event,
these antidotes cannot address the reasons for breakdowns in families
or in law and order; they can only remediate failure because of the way
futurity is embedded in the structure of the bonds. Indeed, it is impos-
sible to understand the recent history and future-oriented time of the
SBBs without underscoring the ways in which issues of racism, poverty
and gender inequality have been reframed as questions of household
volatility and risk (Mitropoulos 2012).
9 There is here the presumption that ‘fragile families’ have been the cause of
increasing rates of imprisonment and recidivism since the 1970s (Wildeman &
Western 2010), as distinct from changes to social policy and criminal law which
have enacted vast differences in the treatment of offenders and sentencing rates of
comparable crimes (see Wacquant 2009).
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Conclusion
While SBBs are currently small in scale and value, they represent a new
and important frontier of social policy, premised on integrating global
finance and key public policy initiators in what are essentially social ex-
periments. Characterised by Social Finance UK as ‘blended (social and
financial) return on investment’ in which the ‘social and financial im-
peratives are aligned’, SBBs enshrine a positive culture of competition
and innovation in social and community services, one enabled by the
application of market discipline that rewards effective service providers;
and therefore crucial to catalysing a new social economy (Bolton &
Savell 2010, pp. 7, 10, 19).
This perspective changes the terms of much contemporary social
policy debate. While concerns for the growth of neoliberalism focus on
the need to defend collective endeavours under the auspices of the state,
here we see collective endeavours re-conceived as private opportunities
for hedge funds and venture capital. What makes the introduction of
SBBs significant in this context is that they open up the domain of the
private (and the calculus of profitability) within the state. In a small but
significant way, SBBs thereby shift many of the conventional debates
about the state and social policy. According to Jane Jensen (2009, p. 450,
emphasis in the original):
In contrast to neoliberalism that focused on restoring market forces
‘displaced’ by social spending, in the social investment perspective
the state may have a legitimate role if it acts to increase the proba-
bility of future profits and positive outcomes. This objective-setting
in future terms is exemplified by the overriding concentration …
on breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty and disadvantage
rather than on ending poverty.
The advocates of SBBs, and those in the welfare sector who embrace
their introduction as manna from heaven, might reflect that while
new projects may come online, and some positive outcomes may be
achieved, the framework of venture capital and the stamp of profitabil-
ity will be setting agendas. In the process, the state itself becomes the
enforcer of – not a site of alternatives, let alone resistance to – those
commercial agendas.
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